T
he exchange-rate stability enjoyed since spring 1995 reflects the progress in convergence achieved by all the Member States of the European Union. This success of the convergence efforts prepares the road for the new ERM proposed some years ago by the European Parliament in order to bind together the Euro area with the currencies not already joining the Euro area on January 1st, 1999. Finally all European institutions agree: a new exchange-rate mechanism is needed in Stage III of EMU in order to link the "ins" and "pre-ins" in the third stage of EMU as a framework to support the final steps to convergence among the "pre-ins" ahead of their participation in the Euro area. The Euro must become a catalyst and the cornerstone for further integration in order to include the other European currencies in the integration process. This will also rightly apply to new members from southern and eastern Europe. ERM II thus is a further link toward facilitating their membership of the European Union.
Experience has shown that exchange-rate stability depends upon sound macroeconomic management but also upon political stability within the European Union. A new ERM will demonstrate the willingness and ability of all 15 member countries to continue together in the framework of the internal market with reinforced cooperation and convergence on the one hand but also solidarity on the other hand.
The Situation in the Current EMS
On 14th October 1996 Finland joined the current European Monetary System (EMS) as well as its exchange-rate mechanism. This is a step which * President of the Monetary Subcommittee of the European Parliament.
considerably increases the likelihood that Finland can be among the first members of the Euro area since the country's convergence outlook compares relatively well. Finland's participation should make it easier for Sweden to join as well because a major reason for Sweden's abstinence so far has been worry about Finnish competition via the exchange rate. Moreover, the Finnish case also shows that entry into the ERM at an appropriately chosen central rate does not incur the risk of speculative attacks, especially at the current fairly wide fluctuation margins which have considerably contributed to the dampening of exchange-rate volatility since August 1993. The success of the 15 percentage point margins underpins the insight that an exchange-rate system must be economically as well as politically credible.
Besides Sweden there are two other countries which are currently not members of the ERM -now the Italy has rejoined -namely Greece and the United Kingdom. Yet in contrast to Sweden they do already participate in the EMS. The UK has so far been reluctant to join the ERM, mainly for domestic political reasons. On the other hand the UK government wants to keep all options open with regard to membership in the Euro area. This necessarily implies that the UK must join the ERM as soon as possible. For the convergence criteria stipulate that a country must observe the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange-rate mechanism of the EMS for at least two years without devaluing against the currency of any other Member State before it can enter the Euro area (EC Treaty, Article 109j). And we have only two years to go until the evaluation by the European Heads of State in 1998 on who will be in at the start of the adoption of the single European currency. Any EU country joining the ERM would strengthen its general political and economic credibility as well as its competitive situation in the Union by showing more commitment. After all, it was not the ERM which led to monetary problems in the EU and in the UK but a wrong political decision on the central sterling rate. To put it more generally: there is no economic reason why any country of the Union should not participate in the ERM under the current conditions. The wide margins, in particular, provide a useful basis for increasing convergence and credibility.
The Exchange-rate System and Monetary Stability
As the experiences of past exchange-rate turmoils have clearly shown, there is no exchange-rate stability without sound macroeconomic policies and economic convergence between the countries concerned. Both a lack of soundness and a lack of convergence will even increase exchange-rate instability within an institutionalised exchange-rate system and finally lead to its breakdown because such a system cannot be credible. It cannot be credible in the first case because the markets know that the stable country will not indefinitely intervene to support the country with unsound policies. In the second case it is also clear that fundamental (real) exchange-rate movements caused by exogenous shocks or divergent developments of productivity etc. cannot be withstood by permanent intervention because this would imply a loss of control over the monetary aggregates and therefore a danger for price stability. It would even be damaging to hamper exchange-rate adjustments in these cases, not only for the strong country but also for the weaker one, because the exchange-rate adjustments help them to keep up with international competition and prevent the weaker countries from pricing themselves out of the markets.
So market participants who know about these issues will try to protect their investments by selling assets denominated in the currency which they expect will inevitably depreciate (and finally devalue). By doing so they will only increase the speed of adjustment to the new exchange-rate equilibrium. The power of such dynamic processes can be impressive, as was seen during the European exchange-rate crises of 1992 and 1993. In these cases political commitment to the existing central rates was clearly untenable with regard to the economic and policy uncertainties, and much turmoil could have been prevented if the political evaluation of the situation had been more realistic.
Past experiences, especially those of 1992 and 1993, are precious when it comes to modifying the European Monetary System to the needs and conditions of Stage III of Economic and Monetary Union, for they help to prevent crises in a transition phase which is critical for further European integration. Therefore the sensitive political and economic transition period which will last until all Member States are also members of the Euro area must by no means be burdened by unnecessary strains from monetary cooperation between "ins" and "pre-ins". This implies that the design of EMS II and ERM II is of strategic importance for the future of the Union.
Whereas sound policies and economic convergence are necessary for exchange-rate stability they are not sufficient to reach that goal. In a world with a daily turnover of foreign exchange to the order of US$ 1300 billion, and considering the fact that markets may well misjudge developments and overshoot in their reactions, it can be useful to give them some guidance. This guidance can be provided for by properly chosen central rates and intervention points with margins reflecting the state of economic convergence. Such an intervention system is by definition credible and will thus assure the market participants that exchange-rate movements will indeed be limited by the intervention bands because market participants who figure with rates beyond will incur losses.
The European Union has achieved substantial progress in recent years, especially in the field of price stability, where rates have been converging at a low level. Indeed the average inflation rate of the EU has fallen to an historical low of under 3% recently. From this side we can thus expect a major contribution to exchange-rate stability. On the other hand substantial risks stem from the fiscal side, where debt and deficit ratios remain at high levels. The debt incurred binds substantial parts of the budgets by interest payments and limits the flexibility of reactions to possible cyclical and other economic problems. Moreover, high indebtedness of the public sector can always threaten price and exchange-rate stability. Another reason for exchange-rate turmoil in this context lies in the fact that highly indebted governments are economically and politically more vulnerable in the case of adverse economic developments. The related risks trigger negative evaluations from the financial markets and volatile exchange rates. One of the most important tasks, especially of the "pre-ins", is therefore to stick to their impressive adjustment efforts even when we have entered Stage Ill of EMU. From the institutional side the incentives for sound fiscal policies will be
